Note: This work is published in its entirety in the current issue of the Georgia Association of Historians.
Sport plays a number of roles in society; the strongest of those roles is as a transmitter of cultural values.
Until recent years, in American society, the sport with the most cultural importance was baseball. The American dream is almost mythically woven into baseball and the two have, in a sense, grown up together. Just as Americans fought over civil rights; owners of baseball teams fought over integration until Jackie Robinson became the first black major leaguer in 1947 (Weir 15). And just as the labor unions fought for worker's rights, in 1972 the Major League Player's Association went on strike, for the first time in the history of baseball, over the reserve clause (Ringolsby 43). As philosopher Jacque Barzun explained, "whoever wants to know the heart and mind of America had better learn baseball (Trujillo and Ekdom 263). Indeed, baseball is often used to communicate the values of this society (Johnson and Frey 4). For instance, the local baseball team operated as Aa public trust@ concerned for:
One of the values that baseball communicates best is the value of sacrifice. A baseball player is often asked to sacrifice his turn at bat to advance a runner into scoring position or to drive in a run. By hitting into an out, sacrificing himself for the good of the team, the player has accomplished the ultimate good. That good is sacrificing the self for the many. That value is evident throughout American society. Even though we may cling to the notion that we are Arugged individualists,@ the individual is often expected to act in a manner that facilitates the community. Soldiers, police officers, fire fighters, and even teachers are asked to sacrifice their own gains and well being for the good of society.
It took just such a sacrifice for baseball to overcome one of its most negative aspects: The reserve clause. Due to this clause, baseball is the only professional sport that does not come under the collective bargaining and federal antitrust laws (Martin 567). Individuals had challenged the reserve clause before, but never had the players organized in an effort to gain the right of collective bargaining. The exigency that led to this cooperative effort, many believe, was Curt Flood's legal assault on the reserve clause in 1970. This case is singled out as the turning point despite the fact that the verdict went against Curt Flood's bid for free agency. Flood's case served as, in Marvin Miller's words, a "consciousness raising lever for the players@ (letter to author, 6 May 1990). With this case being the turning point in the player's battle against the reserve clause, the need for analysis of the case is evident.
The purpose of this work is to highlight the aspect of Curt Flood's attack on baseball's reserve system that made it effective; that aspect being Flood serving as martyr for the cause of free agency. In order to conduct this analysis, the reserve clause itself must be described, the history of attacks on it explored, and Flood=s court case (Flood v. Kuhn) examined. A number of conclusions can then be drawn.
The reserve clause is almost as old as organized baseball itself. The National League was founded in 1876, and a primitive version of the reserve clause was implemented in 1880 (70 Civ. 202 at 673). The development of the reserve clause was purely a financial matter:
The reserve clause is, in fact, a term describing a number of clauses that were included in the uniform player's contract. Prior to the strike of 1972, these clauses were routinely included in all player contracts:
6.(a) The Player agrees that this contract may be assigned by the Club (and reassigned by any assignee Club) to any other Club in accordance with Major League rules and the Professional Baseball Rules. . . .
10.(b) The Club's right to renew this contract as provided in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph 10, and the promise of the Player not to play otherwise than with the Club have been taken into consideration. . . .
The basic premise of the reserve clause was then extended in the Major League rules under "tampering":
Thus, under the reserve clause or system, a player was "owned" by the club he signed with and could not negotiate with any other club. This restricted player mobility and the free marketing of a player's skills. Or as Jay Topkis, a member of Flood's team of attorneys, puts it:
Despite the fact that the federal government passed the Sherman Act in 1890 and the Clayton Act in 1914 as means of combating monopolies and restraint of trade (Blackwell 859) baseball managed to remain exempt from such legislation. This exemption was created as a result of the Supreme Court's ruling in the 1922 case Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs (259 U.S. 200+). The Federal Baseball Club decision held that the actions of the National League did not fall under the jurisdiction of such anti-trust legislation as the Sherman and Clayton acts (Prescott 301). Justice Holmes, speaking for the court, explained the exemption from the Sherman and Clayton acts, saying exhibitions of baseball were Apurely state affairs@ (259 U.S. 208.) and that baseball A. . . would not be called trade or commerce in the commonly accepted use of those words" (259 U.S. 209.) This decision served as the case law precedent for the preservation of the anti-trust restriction of trade that resulted from the reserve clause.
In 1949, Danny Gardella sued baseball when he was blacklisted through the reserve clause. Gardella had been excluded from playing in the Major Leagues after he was caught playing in the Mexican Leagues. Gardella sought damages and sought to have the reserve clause declared an unreasonable restraint of trade (McQuaide 96). The presiding judge, Learned Hand, decided that the advent of broadcasting had moved baseball closer to the level of interstate commerce as covered by antitrust laws; but he ruled that the district court, not the court of appeals had jurisdiction over that type of determination (Gardella v. Chandler)( 172 F.2d 402, 407-408). This decision was reaffirmed later in 1949 in the similar instances involved in Martin v. National League Baseball Club (McQuaide 97). Thus Federal Baseball was twice upheld by default when Aout of court settlements and the reinstatement of the three players" averted further litigation at the District Court level.
In 1951, Congress decided to examine Baseball's exemption from antitrust legislation, and four bills were introduced toward that end. However,"The Congressional study came to the conclusion that it was too early to enact general legislation for baseball" (McQuiade 97). Congress returned the matter to the courts.
The Federal Baseball ruling was further strengthened in 1953 when the Supreme court ruled in Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc. that, "Congress had no intention of including the business of baseball within the scope of federal anti-trust laws@ (346 U.S. at 357). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Burton writes:
Thus, the Supreme Court had elevated professional baseball above all other businesses, allowing it to operate in a monopolistic manner and practice restraint of trade.
Curt Flood was not the only individual to challenge baseball's anti-trust exemption in 1970. The other case, moving through the dockets in New York, reached appellate decision while Flood's decision was still pending. In Salerno v. The American League (429 F. 2d 1003) two former umpires charged the American League with monopolistic practices and restraint of trade (Menitove 737). The court dismissed this action on the grounds that it had no jurisdiction in the matter. The matters of jurisdiction and precedent in this case, according to Marvin Miller, hinge in part on the "establishment" nature of the courts:
Before 1970, all attacks against the reserve clause had shared one of two common themes: the plaintiff in question was blacklisted and sued Major League Baseball claiming that, due to the reserve clause, Baseball had violated of the Sherman Anti-trust Act and Clayton Act; or the player in question sued on the grounds that Toolson was outdated by advances in the electronic media. The Flood case took these approaches, but added a more personalized element, Curt Flood as victim, and martyr.
Despite the fact that the Salerno case took place in a similar time frame, it was Curt Flood's battle against the reserve clause that gained nationwide attention. Perhaps this attention was due to the fact that Flood, who played for the St. Louis Cardinals, was merely thirty one years old and considered the best center fielder in the game at that time (Leggett 20). In his twelve years with the Cardinals, Flood batted .285, won seven gold gloves, was chosen as an All-Star three times and set a record for 223 consecutive errorless games (70 Civ. 202 at 37, 39). It is also important to note that Flood believed his primary role in the organization was to contribute to the success of the Cardinals as a team.
Despite his successful performances and despite his sense of unity, Flood was reminded that, after all, he was just another player. After having been a part of the St. Louis community for twelve years and having participated in three World Series with the Cardinals, Flood was informed, via a phone call from the assistant to the Cardinal's General Manager, that he had been traded to the Philadelphia Phillies. Flood found this degrading:
The trade left Flood with three options: To go to Philadelphia, to retire, or to take legal action. Flood chose to take action:
After having made his decision, Flood contacted Marvin Miller the executive director of the player's association and was given the support of that organization.
On Christmas Eve of 1969, Flood sent the following letter to Kuhn:
Flood continued by asking Kuhn to allow him to negotiate independently with the other clubs in the major leagues.
Kuhn, bound by the uniform player contract and the reserve clause, denied Flood's request. Then Flood and his attorneys (headed by former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg) filed suit in New York district court. The case focused on a number of charges:
The case echoed its predecessors in a number of areas. It attacked the reserve clause as an unreasonable restraint of trade,
The case attacked the idea that baseball deserved an exemption:
And the case attacked the manner in which baseball had managed to keep that exemption:
All of these various attacks on the reserve system had been tried and had failed to get either action from the courts or organized action from the players. These attacks failed once again, in the legal arena, as Flood v. Kuhn reached the Supreme Court. The court ruled five to three to uphold Federal Baseball claiming that this was a decision that Congress would have to make ("Loss" 67). But in the Flood case, a second aspect was working; one that, a year later, would lead the players to take collective action for the first time against Major League Baseball and the reserve clause. That motivating aspect was that Flood had become a public victim of the system. His victimization inspired others to take notice of the way the system he was fighting was affecting them as well, and they began to take action. Some, especially the owners of Baseball clubs, felt that Flood was being used as a pawn to break the system ("Players" 74). But others, including Marvin Miller, saw Flood's action for what it was, a sacrifice:
If a sacrifice of this kind were taking place in an area of political unrest, or if Flood had died for a cause, he would be called a martyr. Since his actions led only to the death of his career as a professional ball player, Flood's martyrdom is symbolic. Yet this symbolic martyrdom made the case a powerful motivator of change.
.
Works Cited
Curt Flood and Richard Carter. "My Rebellion." Sports Illustrated. 1 Feb, 1971. 25.
Arthur T. Johnson and James H. Frey. "Introduction," in Government and Sport: The Public Policy Issues. Totowa, NJ: 1985.
William Leggett. "Not a Flood But a Deluge." Sports Illustrated. 1 Feb. 1971. 20-25.
"A Loss for Curt Flood." Time. 3 July 1972, 67.
Barton J. Menitove, "Baseball's AntiTrust Exemption: The Limits of Stare Decisis." Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Review. 12 (1985).
"Players Go To Bat Against Baseball." Business Week. 26 Feb., 1970, 74.
Tracy Ringolsby. "The Seventies." Street and Smith's Baseball, 50 Years. 6 March 1990, 43.
Nick Trujillo and Leah R. Ekdom. "Sportswriting and American Cultural Value: The 1984 Chicago Cubs." Critical Studies in Mass Communication. 2 (1985), 263.
Tom Weir. "Baseball's Greatest Moments." Street and Smith's Baseball, 50 Years. 6 march 1990, 15.